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THE PROBLEM WITH BILSKI: MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC
PATENT CLAIMS REVEAL WEAKNESSES IN A NARROW
SUBJECT MATTER TEST
ANGELA D. FOLLETT*
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution grants Congress broad power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 1 This grant created the U.S. Patent System, subsequently
codified in Title 35 of the United States Code.2 Courts consider compliance
with 35 U.S.C. § 101, the patentability and utility requirement, to be a
threshold requirement to the grant of a patent.
35 U.S.C. § 101 states: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor [sic], subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.”3 The first clause of this
section provides a preliminary bar to patentability, while the second
requires compliance with other sections of the title, namely §§ 102, 103,
and 112, that provide detailed standards for patentability. 4 The inquiry
under § 101 is, however, not trivial; while it is considered by some to be “a
threshold inquiry,” any patent which fails to meet the requirements of this
section will be rejected regardless of whether or not it meets the other
*

Gustavus Adolphus College, BA 2001, University of Minnesota, PhD 2006, University of
St. Thomas, JD Candidate 2011. The author would like to thank Dean Thomas Berg for his help in
directing the scope and preparation of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. (2006).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
4. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (2006). Section 102 requires an invention to be novel, or,
in other words, it must be new (i.e., neither patented nor published in the United States or a
foreign country). 35 U.S.C. § 102. Section 103 renders an invention obvious if “the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. Section 112 places
requirements on the description of an invention, requiring “a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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requirements of the code.5 Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 6
have struggled to define a clear and concise test for assessing patentability
under this section. 7
The Federal Circuit’s decision of In re Bilski highlights one aspect of
this struggle: namely, defining the metes and bounds of the word “process”
within § 101. 8 The statute defines a “process” in 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) as a
“process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”9 When § 101
was originally drafted in the Patent Act of 1793, Thomas Jefferson defined
statutory subject matter to include “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement
[thereof].” 10 The statutory language remained unchanged until the Patent
Act of 1952 when Congress implemented the word “process” in place of
“art.” 11 Accompanying this change, the Committee Reports indicate
“Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the
sun that is made by man.’” 12
Regardless of Congress’ broad intentions for statutory patentability, as
a general principle, the Supreme Court has found that natural principles,
mental thoughts and ideas, and abstract concepts are not patentable, in part,
because these concepts form the basic tools of scientific research.13 Using
this principle as a guide, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
have decided a series of cases attempting to hone a definition for a
patentable “process” and determine its function in deciphering which
inventions are, in fact, patentable under § 101 and which are not. Prior to
the decision in Bilski, § 101 functioned primarily as a low-bar threshold to
patentability, represented, in part, by the standard provided in State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 14 This standard
interpreted the requirements of § 101 broadly, requiring only that a

5. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
6. Patent cases, unlike most other federal cases, have all appeals heard at a singular
appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Filing of patent suits may occur in
any regional district court, but the appeal is always heard at the Federal Circuit and not in the
regional circuit court.
7. Rajendra K. Bera, Patentable Subject Matter Under the US Patent Act, 1952: Cases, 95
CURRENT SCI. 1421, 1421 (2008).
8. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006). Part of the difficulty associated with interpreting this
particular word in the statute may be attributed to the use of the word in its own definition.
10. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting the Act of Feb. 21, 1973, §
1, 1 Stat. 319).
11. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)).
12. Id.
13. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
14. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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patentable process produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”15 For
more than ten years, this broad standard governed application of § 101.
Bilski changed all that by implementing a definitive test that does not focus
on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, but instead required
that a patentable process either (1) ties to a particular machine or apparatus,
or (2) transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. 16 With a
singular decision, the Federal Circuit changed the scope and standards of a
patentable process under § 101.
This imposed requirement for a process patent—the “machine-ortransformation” test—has presented many questions regarding its
application, particularly to areas of patent law outside the business method
claims that framed the case. This article explores the jurisprudence leading
up to the Federal Circuit decision in Bilski and the ramifications of applying
the resulting “machine-or-transformation” test to biotechnology and
medical diagnostic claims. Application of the Bilski test to this class of
claims illustrates the underlying difficulty of crafting a rigid test to
determine the patentability of process patents under § 101 that can be
applied to the broad range of technologies seeking patent protection. The
Supreme Court, in its de novo review of Bilski, should articulate a broad
threshold standard for 35 U.S.C. § 101, removing the rigid bar to
patentability set by the Federal Circuit and returning to a standard that is
consistent with precedent and the statute’s original legislative design. Such
a move would alleviate many of the problems associated with Bilski; for
example, the broad sweeping effect it imposes on biotechnology processes
and medical diagnostic claims through the ill-defined requirement of a tie to
a particular machine or transformation.
Part I of this paper introduces the major problem with the Bilski
decision, namely its misreading of and departure from precedent in the
creation of the “machine-or-transformation” test. Part II discusses the
decision in Bilski, including the Federal Circuit’s purported rationale behind
its implementation of the “machine-or-transformation” requirement. Part III
extends the application of this new standard to medical diagnostic claims;
specifically, comparing the decision in Classen v. Biogen 17 to Prometheus
v. Mayo. 18 Finally, Part IV presents public policy considerations and
proposed changes to the patentable subject matter analysis that the Supreme
Court should consider as it determines the scope and reach of the “machineor-transformation” test.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1374, 1377.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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I. THE ROAD TO BILSKI
The Federal Circuit justified its narrow “machine-or-transformation”
test by misreading and misapplying a series of cases decided by the
Supreme Court. Although the Bilski court claims to conjure support for its
new test within these prior decisions, these cases are better read as
articulating a clear and wide-ranging standard of review that maintains the
broad and embracing character of § 101 intended by Congress. Prior to
Bilski, process patents that avoided the narrow delineated group of
disallowed subject matter (i.e., natural principles, mental thoughts and
ideas, and abstract concepts 19) could successfully pass over § 101’s
threshold bar of patentability and test their invention against the remaining
sections of Title 35. 20 In her dissent to Bilski, Judge Newman summed up
well the fundamental problems with the “machine-or-transformation” test:
“[t]his exclusion of process inventions is contrary to statute, contrary to
precedent, and a negation of the constitutional mandate. Its impact on the
future, as well as on the thousands of patents already granted, is
unknown.” 21
When statutory interpretation is involved, stare decisis is generally
given considerable weight because, unlike constitutional interpretation, the
court must analyze and critique the work of the legislative branch.22 In the
case of § 101, in particular, Congress has not modified the statute in over 20
years, making stare decisis all the more significant.23 According to Judge
Newman, “[t]he only announced support for today’s change appears to be
the strained new reading of Supreme Court quotations. But this court has
previously read these decades-old opinions differently, without objection by
either Congress or the Court. My colleagues do not state a reason for their
change of heart.” 24 As an example of what Judge Newman termed “strained
new readings,” the Federal Circuit claims the Supreme Court first
articulated its dispositive “machine-or-transformation” test in Gottschalk v.
Benson. 25 Although the Benson court did provide that the “machine-ortransformation” test is a clue to the patentability of a process invention,
what the Federal Circuit chose to gloss over was the Court’s clarification
that while
[i]t is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials

19. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
20. M.J. Edwards & Donald Steinberg, The Implications of Bilski: Patentable Subject Matter
in the United States, 49 IDEA 411, 414 (2009).
21. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 993.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
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to a ‘different state or thing[,]’ [w]e do not hold that no process
patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our
prior precedents. 26
The Supreme Court made similar qualifications in its later decisions in
Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr. 27 The Federal Circuit, however,
disregarded these statements just as they did in Benson, stretching the
records to support its decision.
The Bilski decision fundamentally altered § 101, moving away from a
wide and embracing threshold standard toward a rigid bar to patentability.
Imposition of the Bilski exclusion to patentability occurs before
examination of an invention on its merits—in other words, before finding
the invention to be novel, non-obvious, enabled, described, or particularly
claimed. 28 Prior to this decision, compliance with § 101 required little more
than general subject matter eligibility; it had never been truly considered an
independent condition of patentability. 29 Such a change in the status quo of
statutory patentability will undoubtedly have unpredictable implications on
patents issued under the old standard, applications currently pending in the
Patent and Trademark Office, and on inventions not yet conceived.
In the discussion that follows, the Court’s reluctance to place a rigid bar
to patentability under § 101 is clearly illustrated through the progression of
the Benson, Flook, and Diehr decisions. These cases combine to articulate a
clear and wide-ranging standard of review, which the State Street Bank
“useful, concrete and tangible result” test expressed.30 While this test is far
from perfect, it maintained the broad and embracing character of § 101
intended by Congress and defined by precedent. The clarity afforded by this
broad standard provided the statute with the flexibility to embrace not only
current technology, but also innovations not yet achieved. Such clarity, and
its accompanying stability, however, was lost when the decision of In re
Bilski came down. Biotechnology patents particularly feel this loss, and the
confines of a “machine-or-transformation” test place unreasonable limits on
the potential for advancement that this technology area holds.
In its review of Bilski, the Supreme Court must return the analysis
under § 101 to “[a] straightforward, efficient, and ultimately fair approach
to the evaluation of ‘new and useful’ processes—quoting Section 101—
[that recognizes] that a process invention that is not clearly a ‘fundamental
truth, law of nature, or abstract idea’ is eligible for examination for

26.
27.
(1981).
28.
29.
30.
1998).

Id. at 71.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 977 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90).
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
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patentability.” 31
A. Gottschalk v. Benson: Defining What Is Not a Process Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101
Gottschalk v. Benson is the first in a series of cases leading up to Bilski,
which, when taken together, culminate in an expansive standard for
patentability under § 101. Running through these decisions is a theme of
broad inclusion and a resistance to a rigid bar to patentability. Benson
established the general standard that one may not patent a natural principle
(e.g., a formulation or mathematical algorithm) per se. 32 The Court held that
claims directed to a formula for converting binary-coded decimal numbers
into pure binary numbers represented an unpatentable process within the
meaning of the statute.33 In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the
mathematical formula that formed the crux of the claims had little practical
application beyond its claimed use in a digital computer34 and allowing a
claim to the formula would preempt its only practical use and would in
effect be a patent to the algorithm itself.35
In discussing the scope of a patentable process under §101, the Court
highlighted that in some cases, a patentable process will require a direct
connection between the process and the instrumentalities of its
implementation. 36
Such a link, however, is not the sole distinction of a patentable process.
A natural process, for example, may be patentable if the basis of the
invention is “the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.” 37
This “new and useful end” need not necessarily be limited to tying the
process to a particular machine. Instead, the process claim can stake its
patentability on the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a
different state or thing.’” 38 Transformation of the article serves as “the clue
to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines.” 39 Although initially this review of prior decisions may appear to
lay the groundwork for a rigid test of patentability under § 101, the Court
clarified by stating that
[i]t is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials
to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 997.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71–72.
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 67 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
Id. at 70.
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could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents. 40
Scholars have deciphered the discussion of processes in Benson as an
effort by the Court to avoid articulating a test of patentability or a definition
of a “process,” and instead to provide various factors that lead to finding a
particular process unpatentable.41 Such factors include: broad claims that
preempt alternative uses of an algorithm, claims which do not result in a
new and useful end product from the application of an algorithm, claims
which are not directly linked to a particular machine, and claims which do
not transform a particular article to a different state or thing. 42 The holding
in Benson is an indication of the Court’s hesitancy to delineate a precise test
for a process and, as such, the Court provides neither an authoritative
definition of the term process nor a bright-line standard for its review.
Instead, the Court describes inventions that fall outside the meaning of
“process,” making it possible to interpret the term broadly.
B. Beginning to Raise the Bar: Incorporating Novelty and Obviousness into
§ 101
The Court addressed the issue of algorithm patentability again six years
later in its decision in Parker v. Flook, holding that a method for updating
alarm limits, which implemented a mathematical formula for computing
those limits, was unpatentable under § 101. 43 Conventional methods of
altering alarm limits and the disputed claims differed solely in the
application of a “new and presumably better method for calculating alarm
limit values” (i.e., the mathematical formula employed in the method’s
second step). 44 Applying Benson, the Court held the claims unpatentable
because, although the algorithm was new, the process of adjusting alarm
limits was not; the claims, therefore, were “directed essentially to a method
of calculating, using a mathematical formula.”45
The respondent argued that Benson should not apply in this case
because the method claims do not “wholly preempt the mathematical
formula.” 46 The claims were directed to a process within the realm of the

40. Id. at 71.
41. “Thus, in Benson, the Supreme Court articulated various factors that could lead to the
conclusion that the method claims were unpatentable: the claims were so broad that they would
preempt the algorithm itself, the claims did not result in the application of the algorithm to a new
and useful result, the claims did not transform a particular article to a different state or thing, and
the claims were not tied to a particular machine or apparatus.” Edwards & Steinberg, supra note
20, at 414.
42. Id.
43. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
44. Id. at 588, 594–95.
45. Id. at 594–95.
46. Id. at 589–90.
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petrochemical and oil-refining industries, consequently leaving open
alternative applications of the formula within the public domain.47
Moreover, according to the respondent, the latter step of the process—
adjusting the alarm limit based on the value computed by the formulation—
presented “post-solution” activity that distinguished the case from Benson.
The Court disagreed, stating that “[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no
matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.” 48 A claim
that is “directed essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical
formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose” is unpatentable under
§ 101. 49
Although the majority maintained a broad standard for § 101 analysis,
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, argued that the majority expanded the
restriction against patenting mathematical formulas and had, in fact, struck
a “damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by importing into its
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness.” 50
The issue in this case was whether the patentability of a claimed process is
preempted if one step in the process “would not be patentable subject matter
if considered in isolation.” 51 He stated that “[s]ection 101 is concerned only
with subject-matter patentability. Whether a patent will actually issue
depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 103, which include novelty and
inventiveness, among many others.” 52 The dissent illustrates that in
broadening the stringent exemptions to the statutory requirements of §
101, 53 the Court imported standards into the statutory definition of a
patentable process already covered by other sections of the Code. Such a
step begins to narrow the standard previously upheld by the Court, but this
move does not endure.
C. Diehr: An Uncceptable Use of Otherwise Unpatentable Subject Matter
In the decision of Diamond v. Diehr, the Court refined its holdings in
Benson and Flook regarding the patentability of claims having
mathematical formulas.54 The claims involved a method of curing synthetic
rubber, which included continually measuring the temperature within the
curing press, a step the industry had not previously been able to accomplish,
and applying a well-known equation (the Arrhenius equation) to calculate
47. Id.
48. Id. at 590.
49. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595.
50. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 599.
52. Id. at 600.
53. For example: natural principles and mathematical formulas, mental thoughts and ideas,
and abstract concepts.
54. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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an exact cure time for the rubber. The Court found the claims patentable,
regardless of the fact that they included a well-known mathematical
formula. 55 In reconciling the instant claims with those in Benson and Flook,
the Court argued that the claims
do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead they seek
patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their
process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation,
but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather,
they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.56
In this case, the claims were found to involve the “transformation of an
article,” and therefore the physical and chemical changes required for
synthetic rubber molding placed the invention within the bounds of
patentable subject matter under § 101.57
In deciding Diehr, the Court refined and reiterated its earlier holdings
by providing that a process claim that uses a mathematical formula is not
automatically rendered unpatentable by such inclusion. 58 A claim will only
fail the standards of § 101 when the claim seeks to cover the mathematical
formula per se—unpatentability of this type “cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” 59 Claims implementing a mathematical formula are
patentable under § 101 when, “considered as a whole, [the invention is]
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing).” 60
Examination of claims solely to determine compliance with statutory
subject matter effectively eliminated the incorporation of novelty into § 101
introduced by Flook and reintroduced the broad and inclusive scope into §
101 analysis. 61
Through this decision, and in response to the dissent in Flook, the Court
lowered the threshold of § 101 and, in applying the transformation test of
Benson, allowed for the acceptance of natural laws, or mathematical
formulas, as statutory subject matter. Reflecting Diehr’s broad
interpretation of § 101, the Federal Circuit created a standard for review in
State Street Bank Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. that defined
patentable processes for over ten years. 62

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 177–78, 191.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 191 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
Id. at 188–90.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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D. A Utility Standard for § 101
The Federal Circuit decided State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc. in 1998, and its holding formed the backbone of §
101 analysis for process claims up until the decision in Bilski. 63 The claims
at issue in State Street involved a system for monitoring and recording
financial information flow; specifically, the system made all of the
necessary calculations for maintaining a partner fund financial services
configuration. 64 The nature of the business required quick and accurate
performance of the calculations and, given their complexity, a computer
was essentially required to accomplish the task. 65 The lower court had held
that the claimed invention “fell into one of two alternative judicially created
exceptions to statutory subject matter:” the “mathematical algorithm”
exception or the “business method” exception.66
On appeal, the Federal Circuit focused on the broad nature of § 101 and
the distinctiveness of this particular section compared to those focused on
the patentability of a claimed invention—namely §§ 102, 103, and 112. 67
Specifically, the court examined the construction of § 101, stating that
“[t]he plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention falling
within one of the four stated categories of statutory subject matter [i.e., any
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter] may be patented,
provided it meets the other requirements for patentability set forth in Title
35, i.e., those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112, ¶ 2.” 68 Congress’s repetitive
use of the term “any” throughout § 101 provides textual evidence to support
this broad interpretation, which the court relied upon in prohibiting
additional restrictions on patentable subject matter.
Accordingly, the court held that although a mathematical algorithm,
calculation, or formula, being an abstract idea, is not, by itself, patentable,
this deficiency can be overcome if, in fact, the algorithm produces “a
useful, concrete and tangible result.” 69 The holding moved the focus of
finding statutory patentable subject matter from determining whether a
strict physical transformation of the data occurred to determining whether
the transformation of the data was, in fact, “useful.” 70 The court further
clarified its position on § 101 and proposed a move away from strict
construction toward a broad utility requirement: “[t]he question of whether
a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1377.
State St., 149 F.3d at 1372.
Id. at 1373–74.
Id. at 1374.
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the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to—process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter [although it must,
obviously, fall into one of them]—but rather on the essential characteristics
of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.” 71 Under this
standard, the court found it unnecessary to classify the claims under either
the “mathematical algorithm” or “business method” exception articulated
by the lower court.72 The “useful, concrete and tangible result” standard for
§ 101 and its focus on utility was significantly narrowed and refocused by
the decision in Bilski.
Critics have chastised the State Street standard for permitting claims to
inventions that do not involve technology per se: for example, financial
methods, arbitration methods, teaching methods, and even methods for
simple routines such as swinging on a playground swing. 73 In spite of this
criticism, the decision in State Street provided a test for patentability that
applied as well to the business method claims as it did to biotechnology and
medical diagnostic claims. This broad standard properly placed the crux of
an invention’s patentability on its merits, namely novelty and
nonobviousness. In biotechnology, where an innovation may not rely on the
use of a particular machine or the transformation of an article, a broad
standard facilitates patentability. The bulk of patentability may instead
focus on the novelty and nonobviousness of the innovation and not on
compliance with a narrow standard written with only a business method in
mind. The decision in In re Bilski, especially when viewed from the
perspective of biotechnology and medical diagnostics, compounded the
weaknesses of State Street while simultaneously taking away its strengths.
II. BILSKI AND THE “MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION” TEST
In deciding In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit eliminated over ten years of
relative stability in the jurisprudence surrounding § 101 analysis when it
overruled its previous decision in State Street, replacing the “useful,
concrete and tangible result” test with its newly minted “machine-ortransformation” test. 74 Under the “machine-or-transformation” test, “[a]
claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into
a different state or thing.” 75
The test arose from the analysis of Bilski’s patent claiming “[a] method
for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a
71. Id. at 1375 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 1374, 1377.
73. Lilly He, In re Bilski En Banc Rehearing on Patentable Subject Matter: Farewell to
Business Method Patents?, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 254 (2008).
74. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
75. Id. at 954.
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commodity provider at a fixed price.”76 The court explained the nature of
the invention through the following example.
[C]oal power plants (i.e., the “consumers”) purchase coal to
produce electricity and are averse to the risk of a spike in demand
for coal since such a spike would increase the price and their costs.
Conversely, coal mining companies (i.e., the “market participants”)
are averse to the risk of a sudden drop in demand for coal since
such a drop would reduce their sales and depress prices. The
claimed method envisions an intermediary, the “commodity
provider,” that sells coal to the power plants at a fixed price, thus
isolating the power plants from the possibility of a spike in demand
increasing the price of coal above the fixed price. The same
provider buys coal from mining companies at a second fixed price,
thereby isolating the mining companies from the possibility that a
drop in demand would lower prices below that fixed price. And the
provider has thus hedged its risk; if demand and prices skyrocket, it
has sold coal at a disadvantageous price but has bought coal at an
advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and prices fall.77
The claim does not recite how the method is to be implemented and is
not tied to the use of a computer; 78 in fact, “[n]o hardware is required to
perform the method, although performing the steps on a machine would
infringe.” 79 In addition, the claim is not limited by a particular type of
commodity 80—it is not even tied expressly or impliedly to any physical
subject matter, tangible or intangible.81 These factors, and the application of
the “machine-or-transformation” test, led the court to affirm the decision of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and find the claims
unpatentable. 82
A. The Majority’s “Machine-or-Transformation” Test
The court framed the issue in Bilski as a question of whether
Applicant’s claims were drawn to a fundamental principle and, if so,
whether the claims, if allowed, would effectively preempt all uses of that
fundamental principle.83 In answering these questions, the court concluded
that § 101 requires a claim to be limited to particular applications of a
fundamental principle, and therefore renders unpatentable any claim to a
76. Id. at 949.
77. Id. at 949–50.
78. Id. at 950.
79. Benjamin J. McEniery, The Federal Circuit in Bilski: The Machine-or-Transformation
Test, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 253, 254 (2009).
80. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 949.
83. Id. at 952.
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fundamental principle itself. 84 To reach this conclusion, the court disavowed
the long-standing “useful, concrete and tangible result test,” finding its
application potentially useful as an indicator of patentability, but wholly
insufficient to ensure the limitations required under the statute.85
In reframing an analysis of statutory subject matter, the majority in
Bilski attempted to rely solely on an application of existing Supreme Court
precedent. In particular, the court relied heavily on many of the decisions
discussed supra—namely, Gottschalk v. Benson, Diamond v. Diehr and
Parker v. Flook. In interpreting these cases, the majority determined that the
Supreme Court had laid down a definitive test for process patentability,86
stating “the proper inquiry under § 101 is not whether the process claim
recites sufficient ‘physical steps,’ but rather whether the claim meets the
“machine-or-transformation” test.” 87
As stated above, the “machine-or-transformation” test requires a
claimed process to be either (1) directly tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or (2) involve the transformation of a particular article into a
different state or thing. 88 In addition, the court articulated two corollaries to
the test. 89 First, field-of-use limitations, those which would limit the claim
to a particular use or purpose, are not sufficient to supply patentability to an
otherwise unpatentable process. 90 Second, the involvement of a machine or
transformation to the claimed process must provide meaningful limitations
to the claim and amount to more than “insignificant postsolution activity.”91
The majority provided limited guidance on the test’s application. With
regard to the machine prong of the test in particular, the court did little to
explain its application and scope as the language of the Bilski claims were
not limited to a particular machine or apparatus.92 The court, therefore, felt
it was appropriate to “leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise
contours of machine implementation, as well as . . . whether or when
recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular
machine.” 93

84. Id. at 954 (“A claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a particular
machine or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not also use the specified
machine or apparatus in the manner claimed. And a claimed process that transforms a particular
article to a specified different state or thing by applying a fundamental principle would not preempt the use of the principle to transform any other article, to transform the same article but in a
manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything other than transform the specified article.”).
85. Id. at 959.
86. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
87. Id. at 961.
88. Id. at 954.
89. Id. at 957.
90. Id. at 957, 961.
91. Id. at 957, 962.
92. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
93. Id.
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The decision in Bilski focused instead on the second prong of the test,
whether the claims included a transformation of an article to a different
state or thing. 94 In articulating the spectrum of patentable transformations,
the court held at one end the “virtually self-evident” processes involving
“chemical or physical transformation of physical objects or substances” as
clearly eligible subject matter. At the other end of the spectrum, processes
involving the transformation of electronic data representing abstract
constructs or intangibles are ineligible.95 Recognizing the importance of
inventions involving electronic transformations of data, the court clarified
that while the addition of a data-gathering step is insufficient to render an
algorithm patentable, 96 “[s]o long as the claimed process is limited to a
practical application of a fundamental principle to transform specific data,
and the claim is limited to a visual depiction that represents specific
physical objects or substances,” the claim is patentable and avoids the
dangers of patenting a fundamental principle.
B. Development of the “Machine-or-Transformation” Test
The Federal Circuit claims that the “machine-or-transformation” test
was born—albeit indirectly—out of the decision in Benson, where the
Supreme Court stated the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines.” 97 The Court in Benson went on to
articulate that compliance with the “machine-or-transformation” test was
not the sole requirement for a patentable process:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials
to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent
could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents. 98
In Bilski, however, the Federal Circuit interpreted the Court’s
application of the Benson test in Flook and Diehr to indicate the Supreme
Court’s intention that the “machine-or-transformation” test become the
requirement for all patentable processes under § 101. 99 In addressing its
reliance on the test in Benson, the Federal Circuit court stated:
We believe that the Supreme Court spoke of the machine-or-

94. Id. at 962.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 963 (“A requirement simply that data inputs be gathered—without specifying
how—is a meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because every algorithm inherently
requires the gathering of data inputs.”).
97. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
98. Id. at 71.
99. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56.
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transformation test as the “clue” to patent-eligibility because the
test is the tool used to determine whether a claim is drawn to a
statutory “process”—the statute does not itself explicitly mention
machine implementation or transformation. We do not consider the
word “clue” to indicate that the machine-or-implementation test is
optional or merely advisory. Rather, the Court described it as the
clue, not merely “a” clue.100
The rationale discussed by the majority, and their apparent
interpretation and application of precedent, was met with resistance. Judge
Newman, as one example, argued in her dissent that the majority missed its
target of framing a rule in reliance on Supreme Court precedent and instead
clearly violated it. 101 In particular, she focused on the clear statements of the
Court emphasizing its desire to avoid an all-encompassing rule based, in
part, on the broad nature of § 101. For example, Judge Newman quoted the
Court in Flook, where it stated:
The statutory definition of “process” is broad. An argument can be
made, however, that this Court has only recognized a process as
within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular
apparatus or operated to change materials to a “different state or
thing.” As in Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may
issue even if it does not meet one of these qualifications of our
earlier precedents.102
Judge Newman argued that, in ignoring the initial statement “[a]n
argument can be made” and the qualifying sentence that follows, the
majority manipulated the precedential cases to create an all-encompassing
test not envisioned by the Court. 103 Referring to the majority’s justification
explaining away the apparent equivocal nature of the Benson decision, she
bluntly states, “there is nothing equivocal about ‘We do not so hold.’” 104
The majority, however, stood firm in its application of its version of
Supreme Court precedent, with only one caveat:
[W]e agree that future developments in technology and the sciences
may present difficult challenges to the machine-or-transformation
test, just as the widespread use of computers and the advent of the
Internet has begun to challenge it in the past decade. Thus, we
recognize that the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to alter or
perhaps even set aside this test to accommodate emerging
technologies. And we certainly do not rule out the possibility that
this court may in the future refine or augment the test or how it is
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 956 n.11.
Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 979 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978)).
Id. at 979 n.1, 980.
Id. at 979.
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applied. At present, however, and certainly for the present case, we
see no need for such a departure and reaffirm that the machine-ortransformation test, properly applied, is the governing test for
determining patent eligibility of a process under § 101. 105
This statement did away with all other constructions of § 101 and
created in their stead a definitive test for patentability.
C. The Test Applied to Bilski and Its Effect on the Stability of the Patent
Process
Caveats and exceptions aside, the “machine-and-transformation” test, as
applied to the claims at issue in Bilski, resulted in an affirmation of the
Board’s finding of unpatentability. The claimed process of hedging risk did
not involve a transformation of a physical substance as required under the
test. 106 “Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or
private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or
substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or
substances.” 107 The majority declared that Bilski’s claims, if allowed,
“would effectively pre-empt any application of the fundamental concept of
hedging and mathematical calculations inherent in hedging (not even
limited to any particular mathematical formula).”108 Given that the claims
admittedly did not involve the application of a particular machine or
apparatus, the claims failed the “machine-or-transformation” test and
therefore did not qualify under the Federal Circuit’s newly-implemented
bounds of § 101. 109
The “useful, concrete and tangible result” espoused in State Street was
not without its flaws. Following the State Street decision, the Patent Office
was overwhelmed with claims that did not involve technology, per se.110
Instead, the applications, which met the standards of State Street, related to
financial methods, arbitration methods, teaching methods, and even
methods for simple routines such as swinging on a playground swing. 111 In
the years following State Street, the patent office and the courts worked to
create confines for patentable processes and offer transparent guidelines. 112
This work provided strong motivation for the rigid Bilski standard.
The decision in Bilski, however, left many open questions regarding the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 963–64.
Id. at 965–66.
Id. at 966.
He, supra note 73, at 254.
Id.
Id.
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impact of the “machine-or-transformation” requirement on future patents
and those that were issued under the State Street standard. Judge Newman
summarized it well when she stated in her dissent, “[i]ndeed, the full reach
of today’s change of law is not clear . . . . Uncertainty is the enemy of
innovation. These new uncertainties not only diminish the incentives
available to new enterprise, but disrupt the settled expectations of those
who relied on the law as it existed.”113 Scholars have contended that “the
Federal Circuit succeeded in bringing an element of predictability to the
jurisprudence of 35 U.S.C. § 101, [however,] it also placed a cloud of
invalidity over a substantial number of issued method claims” which may
not meet the narrow Bilski standard. 114
Claim 1 in U.S. Patent No. 7,514,221 (entitled, “Diagnostic Assay and
Method of Treatment Involving Macrophage Inhibitory Cytokine-1 (MIC1)”) provides but one example of such a claim:
1. A method of diagnosis of colonic cancer or rectal cancer
characterized by an increased level of expression of MIC-1, said
method comprising;
(i) determining the amount of MIC-1 present in a body sample
taken from a human test subject,
(ii) comparing said determined amount against the amount, or range
of amounts, of MIC-1 present in equivalent body sample(s) from
normal subject(s), and
(iii) diagnosing colonic cancer or rectal cancer when the amount of
MIC-1 determined in step (i) is increased compared to said amount,
or range of amounts, of MIC-1 present in equivalent body
sample(s) from normal subject(s) and wherein said amount
determined in step (i) is greater than 1050 pg/ml; wherein said body
sample is a sample of blood serum or plasma. 115
This claim would presumptively fail to meet the requirements of the
“machine-or-transformation” test. It is neither tied to a particular machine,
nor, as will be discussed in more detail below, does the transformation
described appear to meet the necessary requirements of the test.116
Biotechnology is but one example of the far-reaching implications of
the Bilski decision cautioned by Judge Newman. The following section of
this paper will explore two recent decisions involving medical diagnostic
claims—Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC 117 and Prometheus

113. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977 (Newman, J., dissenting).
114. Eric D. Kirsch & Elizabeth Reilly, The Emperor Bilski’s Wearing No Clothes, in 2
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT LITIGATION 2009, at 71, 91–92 (2009).
115. Id. at 90.
116. Id. at 90–91.
117. Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Laboratories, Inc., v. Mayo Collaborative Services 118—and the inconsistent
application of the “machine-or-transformation” test used to arrive at their
ultimate holdings. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari to hear the
Bilski case, and may provide yet another change to the statutory framework
defined by § 101. The problems highlighted by the decisions in Classen and
Prometheus illustrate the greater implications of defining statutory subject
matter when it evaluates this “definitive” test.
III. APPLYING THE “MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION” TEST TO MEDICAL
DIAGNOSTIC CLAIMS
Two medical diagnostic cases have been decided since the
implementation of the Bilski “machine-or-transformation” test for statutory
subject matter—Classen and Prometheus. The former was a non-binding,
single-paragraph decision, while the other received full review and
discussion by the Federal Circuit. These decisions provide only two
examples of the inherent problems with the Bilski standard but together
argue strongly for a thorough overhaul of the “machine-or-transformation”
test by the Supreme Court.
A. Immunizations Are Not Transformative
The Federal Circuit declared the Classen claims invalid in a short and
seemingly off-hand decision. As stated above, the opinion came down as a
single paragraph stating, “In light of our decision in In re Bilski . . . we
affirm . . . that these claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dr. Classen’s
claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or apparatus’ nor do they
‘transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing.’”119 The
claims at issue involved a method of determining an immunization
schedule, and read:
A method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects
the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated disorder in
a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of
mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in the treatment
group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more
immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and
comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said
chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such
a disorder, in the treatment group, with that in the control group.120
Prior to the decision in Bilski, the broad Classen claims may well have
been found unpatentable based on the precedents already in front of the
118. Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
119. Classen, 304 Fed. App’x at 867.
120. U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283, claim 1 (filed Aug. 4, 1994).
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court. Applying the preemption test in Benson and Flook, these sweeping
claims improperly preempt all uses of the broad and basic comparison
claimed. 121 This determination follows from recognition that every other
activity described in the claims, apart from the comparison of the two test
groups, is no more than data gathering necessary to make the comparison.
The Federal Circuit, however, in creating its definitive test in Bilski, has
effectively rendered the preemption test meaningless by making its own test
controlling. Admittedly, the Classen claims do not tie to a particular
machine or apparatus, but the question of whether or not there is a
transformation of an article to a different state or thing is less clear.
Dr. Warren D. Woessner, an immunologist, for one, argues that the
Federal Circuit’s simplistic dismissal of the claims in Classen was
improper. 122 He contends that the step of mammal immunization inherently
involves the transformation of the mammal from “a nonimmune state to an
immune state. More particularly, the process of immunization, also known
as vaccination, involves the transformation of naïve immune cells into
mature immune cells.” 123 This process would appear to meet the
requirements of a transformation under the Bilski standard. 124
Although this decision was non-precedential, it placed the application
of the “machine-or-transformation” test in apparent flux. It begs the
question: what is required for a patentable transformation under Bilski?
Richard Sybert and David Heckadon have argued that the claims in Classen
would have met the standard if the forefront of the claim included the
inherent transformation; for example, the claim may have been more
successful had it recited: “Physically transforming mammals into an
immunized state by applying . . . .” 125 The claims in Classen are
representative of many types of diagnostic claims in their lack of

121. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972).
122. Warren D. Woessner & Tania A. Shapiro-Barr, Federal Circuit Applies Bilski Standard
in Classen, 9 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1 (Mar. 2009).
123. Id. (“When a mammal is vaccinated, a small amount of a ‘non-self’ antigen (or
immunogen), typically derived from a disease-causing organism, is introduced into the mammal's
system. Upon encountering the non-self antigen, naïve T cells (a type of immune cell) are
transformed into mature T cells. Mature T cells either act directly to eliminate the non-self
antigen, or they effect the transformation of naïve B cells (another type of immune cell) into active
B cells. Active B cells produce antibodies that attack the non-self antigen. Once B cells and T
cells have been activated, some are transformed into memory cells. Memory cells serve
throughout the lifetime of the mammal as reserve forces ready to attack a previously encountered
antigen. In this way, the immune response to a second and subsequent exposure to an antigen is
faster and stronger, which is the purpose of immunization.”).
124. Id.
125. RICHARD SYBERT & DAVID HECKADON, THE IMPACT OF BILSKI ON BUSINESS METHOD
PATENTS LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING PROCEDURAL CHANGES, FORMING NEW PATENT
FILING STRATEGIES, AND FORECASTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE
IMPACT OF THE BILSKI DECISION AND ITS RECENT APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 11 (Aspatore
ed., Aug. 2009), available at 2009 WL 2510889.
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attachment to a particular type of machine.126 In addition, many types of
diagnostic claims do not benefit from a transformation. 127 The diagnostic
method claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,514,221 discussed above are but one
example of issued claims that, on their face, do not meet the standards set
forth in Bilski. The lack of a clear rationale behind the court’s holding in
Classen has left the fate of such claims under the “machine-ortransformation” test unclear.
B. An Apparently Patentable Transformation
Prometheus v. Mayo presents an alternative interpretation of a
patentable process involving a transformation under the Bilski test. The
claims at issue in Prometheus involved a method of optimizing the
therapeutic effect of 6-mercaptopurine (6-MP) and its prodrug,
azathiopurine (AZA), to minimize toxic side effects. 128 Claim 1 of U.S.
Patent No. 6,355,623, which is representative of the asserted claims, reads:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject
having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having
said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per
8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of
said drug subsequently administered to said subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per
8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of
said drug subsequently administered to said subject.129
The claims can be summarized as having three steps: (1) administer the
drug; (2) determine the resulting metabolite levels; and (3) recognize that a
dosage adjustment may be needed. 130
Similar to Bilski, the issue of this case was whether the claims
preempted a fundamental principle or the application of a fundamental
principle. 131 Applying the “machine-or-transformation” test to the claims
presented, the Federal Circuit decided, contrary to Classen, that “the
methods of treatment claimed in the patents in suit squarely fall within the

126.
127.
128.
2009).
129.
130.
131.

Woessner & Shapiro-Barr, supra note 122.
Id.
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1342.
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realm of patentable subject matter because they ‘transform an article into a
different state or thing,’ and this transformation is ‘central to the purpose of
the claimed process.’” 132
The court went on to explain its holding by clarifying that “[t]he
transformation is of the human body following administration of a drug and
the various chemical and physical changes of the drug’s metabolites that
enable their concentrations to be determined.”133 The fact that the
transformation is facilitated entirely by the natural processes occurring
within the body does not prevent the patentability of the method. Instead,
by the courts rationale, the physical administration of an artificial substance
(in this case, the drug) initiates the natural process, and the administration
itself triggers the subsequent transformations.134 Allowance of these claims
does not threaten the natural processes themselves because the claims do
not preempt the processes; instead, the invention uses the body’s natural
response in a series of well-defined steps with the goal of treating various
diseases. 135 According to the Federal Circuit, “[i]t is clear that these
methods of treatment are § 101 patentable subject matter.”136
C. A Fundamental Divergence
The decision in Classen left much to be desired, but the Federal
Circuit’s recent decision in Prometheus provided greater scrutiny of
medical diagnostic claims. The inconsistent interpretation of a patentable
transformation between these two decisions, however, afforded little clarity
for future applications of Bilski to this particular subset of claims. In
Prometheus, the court made a point of stating that “[t]he asserted claims are
in effect claims to methods of treatment, which are always transformative
when a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the
effects of an undesired condition.” 137 Comparison of the claims in Classen
and Prometheus, however, leaves many questions about how their minimal
differences could lead to such varied results. First, both Classen and
Prometheus involved the physical administration of a foreign substance to a
mammal; in the case of Classen, the substance was an immunogen, while in
Prometheus, the substance was a therapeutic drug. Second, both substances
initiated a series of natural processes within the mammal, which, under the
standards set forth in Prometheus, should constitute a patentable
transformation. Third, both sets of claims represent a “method of
treatment.” The claims in Prometheus clearly classify themselves as such in
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1345 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 1346.
Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346–47.
Id. at 1347–49.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1346.
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the preamble of the claim and further define the scope of the claim as
preventing toxic side reactions related to administration of the drug; 138 but it
is hardly inconsistent to consider the prevention of chronic immunemediated disorders through immunization any less of a treatment method.
As was suggested by one scholar following the Classen decision,
perhaps the decision simply requires framing an invention using the right
words. 139 This concern has also been voiced with respect to the machine
prong of the Federal Circuit’s test. 140 In 2001, following the decision in
Diamond v. Diehr, Cohen and Lemly identified a similar response to that
decision as “the doctrine of the magic words.” 141 These scholars claim that
the patentability of software patents following the Diehr decision came to
hinge on whether or not the patent applications and corresponding claims
purported to patent something entirely different from software.142 In fact,
“knowledgeable patent attorneys did exactly that, claiming software
inventions as hardware devices, pizza ovens, and other ‘machines.’”143
Similarly, medical diagnostic claims may need to be recast as “a method of
treatment” or as “a process of transforming a mammal” to traverse the
barrier created by Bilski. Skillful patent attorneys and agents will need to
develop ways to make the abstract ideas appear to conform to the standards
set by the “machine-or-transformation” test, but, as can be seen by the
aftermath of Diehr, such has been accomplished before. 144
IV. A NEW REVIEW OF THE ANALYSIS FOR § 101
The Bilski decision is not yet an irreversible standard upon which
patentable subject matter under § 101 will be judged. On June 1st, 2009, the
Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari in Bilski v. Doll. 145 While the
Court approved two issues for review, the remainder of this paper discusses
the first issue: 146 whether the Supreme Court’s historical avoidance of
unnecessary limitations to the broad inclusiveness of § 101 renders the
138. The court relies on this fact in its argument stating that “[t]he invention’s purpose to treat
the human body is made clear in the specification and the preambles of the asserted claims.” Id. at
1345.
139. SYBERT & HECKADON, supra note 125.
140. Stefania Fusco, Is In Re Bilski a Déjà Vu, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009).
141. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Fusco, supra note 140, at 8.
145. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.
Ct. 2735, 2735 (2009).
146. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (2009), 2009 WL 226501;
the second issue for review is “[w]hether the Federal Circuit’s ‘machine-or-transformation’ test
for patent eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful patent protection to many business
methods, contradicts the clear Congressional intent that patents protect ‘method[s] of doing or
conducting business.’” Id.
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Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test inappropriate and
inconsistent with precedent. 147 Given the inherent problems with the
“machine-or-transformation” test highlighted in its application to diagnostic
method claims, for example, the Court must consider the implications of
such a strict and narrow standard in deciding its fate. Should the Court
decide to restate the standards upon which patentable subject matter is to be
judged, it would be appropriate to rely not only upon its own jurisprudence,
but to also consider policy implications, something the Federal Circuit
failed to do.
A. Public Policy: The Unconsidered Factor in Bilski
In framing its decision as an application of existing Supreme Court
precedent, the clear lack of any policy-based analysis in the Federal
Circuit’s decision is apparent. The Federal Circuit grounds this practice in
the belief that public policy considerations lie solely within the domain of
the legislature and the Supreme Court.148 In fact, its reluctance to address or
admit the patent policy created by its decisions has spurred scholars to
argue that, specifically in the industries of biotechnology and software, “the
Federal Circuit has gotten the policy precisely backwards, perhaps because
it is not making industry-specific patent policy intentionally.”149 Ignoring
the pressures and considerations of public and patent policy has moved the
Federal Circuit, as is confirmed with its decision in Bilski, away from a
flexible approach to one that revels in bright-line rules. 150 The rules are
often inconsistent and inappropriate with the technology-neutral design of
statutory patent law.151 The Supreme Court, however, has not imposed such
limitations and should consider the public policy behind decision of
whether or not to grant particular patents.
1. A Balance of Interests
To discuss the public policy behind patenting, consideration must be
given to the fact that the patent system was mandated by the U.S.
Constitution to “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”152 To
accomplish this goal, the patent system rewards the creative activity of
authors and inventors through the provision of a limited monopoly balanced
by requiring full public access to the innovation upon its expiration.153 Such
147. Id.
148. McEniery, supra note 79, at 255.
149. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1578 (2003).
150. Id. at 1579.
151. Id. at 1576–77.
152. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
153. Michael A. Shimokaji & Philip L. Gahagan, Mind over Matter: The Bilski Decision, Like
Others Before It, Reveals How Courts Have Frequently Kept Patent Law Lagging Behind
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a balance is not struck freely, and
[p]atent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as
surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that
underprotection can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to
sail between these opposing and risky shoals is through rules that
bring certain types of invention and discovery within the scope of
patentability while excluding others.154
Biotechnology, including medical diagnostics, clearly illustrates the
tension between the inventor and the public good. On one side of the issue
are the inventors and the biotech industry. Unlike other technology areas
(for example, the software and financial services industries discussed
directly in Bilski), “the biotech industry relies very heavily on its
intellectual property for sustainability.”155 One explanation for this reliance
is the amount of time and money required for the development and
implementation of a new drug or diagnostic. The process of bringing a new
drug to market can take, on average, a decade or more and cost hundreds of
millions of dollars. 156 Patents, and the monopoly afforded by them, provide
incentive for the financial gamble taken by these innovators. If, however,
the ability to obtain patents and guarantee the protection of their intellectual
property is eliminated, “it will likely become more difficult for biotech
companies to attract investors, which will in turn discourage invention and
the advancement of science.” 157
The other side of the balancing scale holds researchers and the public.
They argue that the monopoly afforded by patents offers control over
innovation that results in more harm than good. 158 As one example, the
American Civil Liberties Union has gathered a group of plaintiffs
composed of medical and scientific organizations, individual researchers
and physicians, and cancer patients to challenge a series of patents held by
Myriad Genetics. 159 These patents are directed to the breast cancer
susceptibility genes BRCA1 and BRCA2; as a result of these patents,
research and diagnostic testing involving these genes require the approval
of, and generally some payment to, Myriad. 160 The complaint argues that
Technology, 32 L.A. LAW 36, 39 (2009) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
154. Kirsch & Reilly, supra note 114, at 71 (quoting Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted).
155. Marc S. Friedman et al., Biotech’s Biggest Fear Might Come True: Pure Method Patents
Might Become Extinct, 196 N.J. L.J. 65, 65 (2009).
156. Burk & Lemley, supra note 149, at 1581.
157. Friedman et al., supra note 155, at 65.
158. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, No. 09-4515 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 12,
2009).
159. Id.
160. Id.

100325 Follett Ready for Proofs (Schmall)

2009]

THE PROBLEM WITH BILSKI

10/2/2011 8:12 PM

253

control over something as fundamental as genetic material prevents the
progression of important scientific discoveries and significantly hinders the
operation of doctors and their patients towards finding a cure.161 This case
draws a picture of the less flattering side of the patent monopoly.
The Myriad case is not the first time advances in biotechnology and
medicine have been challenged on public policy grounds. As one example,
when the Patent & Trademark Office issued the first patent to a surgical
method, healthcare practitioners voiced their concerns about their ability to
treat their patients without the threat of being sued for infringement. 162
Instead of excluding such methods from the category of statutory subject
matter, however, Congress provided a new provision to the Patent Act 163
that “permitted health practitioners and health care facilities to engage in
‘medical activity’ that infringed a patent without fear of being sued for
infringement.” 164 The nature of the claims in Myriad do not permit this
provision to exempt medical practitioners from infringement, but this action
by Congress provides one example of how the interests of both the
inventors and the public can be served without placing unnecessary
limitations on the grant of patents.
Upholding the decision in Bilski may threaten the progress of science
by hindering the ability of biotech companies to realize a return on their
substantial investment. This industry “is developing critically important
ways to diagnose and treat diseases and screen for compounds that often
involve processes that could very well fail Bilski’s ‘matter or
transformation’ test.” 165 This begs the question of whether this is a cost that
the public can afford.
2. There Is Something to Be Said for Stability
The decision in Bilski undid a period of relative stability in the
jurisprudence surrounding patentable subject matter under § 101. As was
discussed above, the “useful, concrete and tangible result” inquiry had
provided the standard for review over the last decade and offered guidance
for issued patents in a variety of technology areas. The implementation of
the “machine-or-transformation” test ushered in an uncertainty not only to
those patents not yet written, but more importantly, the decision has left the
validity of many issued patents in doubt.166 The retroactive application of
the Bilski test leaves this latter group without the ability to develop new

161. Id.
162. Robert Green Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject
Matter Under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L. REV. 217, 226 (2004).
163. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2001).
164. Sterne & Bugaisky, supra note 162, at 226.
165. Friedman et al., supra note 155, at 65.
166. Fusco, supra note 140, at 9.
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patent practices directed to drafting around the new requirements. 167 Judge
Newman brought this argument to the forefront in her dissent arguing:
Unstable law is the enemy of innovation. These new uncertainties
not only diminish the incentives available to new enterprise, but
disrupt the settled expectations of those who relied on the law as it
existed. . . I don’t know how much human creativity and
commercial activity will be devalued by today’s change in law; but
neither do my colleagues. 168
The Supreme Court needs to consider many aspects of patentability,
both existent law and the framework needed to support the public policy
requirements for patents. Judge Newman had the right idea when she
argued that “[a] straightforward, efficient, and ultimately fair approach to
the evaluation of ‘new and useful’ processes is to recognize that a process
invention that is not clearly a ‘fundamental truth, law of nature, or abstract
idea’ is eligible for examination for patentability.” 169 This is the standard
that framed the drafting of § 101 and remained untouched for nearly 200
years; it should stay that way.
B. Viable Alternatives
The Supreme Court has many options to consider in redesigning the
utility standard under § 101. First, the Court could revert to the “useful,
concrete and tangible result” of State Street, but, as was discussed supra, the
standard was not a perfect one. The Court must address the influx of
business method patents, but it is merely one of many factors for the
Court’s consideration as it develops a standard that provides certainty,
clarity, and flexibility to process patentability. In the wake of Bilski, many
scholars have stepped forward to propose alternatives to the “machine-ortransformation” test. A few of these alternatives will be addressed briefly,
and their implications considered.
One approach that has been proposed involves modeling the current
U.S. patent system on the more restrictive European system. 170 The
European Patent Office (EPO) requires patents to claim only those
inventions that make a technical contribution. 171 This requirement was
added with the intention of focusing patent law towards those inventions
which are intuitively seen as technical in nature172 and it is supplemented
with a series of expressly excluded categories of subject matter:
167. Id.
168. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 977, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 997.
170. Reinier B. Bakels, Should Only Technical Inventions be Patentable, Following the
European Example?, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 50, ¶ 4 (2008).
171. Id. at ¶ 11.
172. Id. at ¶ 14.
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(a) mere discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical models,
(b) aesthetic creations, (c) schemes, rules and methods for
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business and
programs for computers, (d) presentation of information, (e)
methods of treatment of the human or animal body, and (f) plant or
animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals. 173
The addition of a technology requirement, however, has not proved to
be a perfect solution, and has not provided a clear definition of patentable
subject matter or prevented the issuance of patents that exceed its traditional
boundaries, however they are defined. 174 In fact, the requirement “has led to
complicated rules and legal uncertainty” and simply provides a restatement
of the struggle between age-old principles and the influx of new, and yet
undefined, inventions. 175 Such a rule provides little guidance to the
patentability of process claims; as has been shown in Europe, without a
legal definition of a “technical contribution,” the determination of
patentable subject matter remains unclear.
Taken whole cloth, the European method of analyzing patentability
spells the death of medical diagnostic claims as they are currently known.
Additional subject matter exclusions, such as the methods of treatment
exclusions described above, could likely result in a return of “the magic
words” doctrine. To avoid the pitfalls of the excluded subject matter, claim
drafters would be required to characterize their inventions as including
technical contributions or draft their claims to maintain the appearance of
claiming something other than the prohibited invention. Since the European
modifications to patentable subject matter exclude diagnostic and method of
treatment claims and have not provided much-needed clarity, other methods
of analysis should be explored by the Court.
Michael Risch proposes a different approach in his article, Everything is
Patentable. 176 He argues that the Supreme Court should implement a single
rule:
[A]ny invention that satisfies the Patent Act’s requirements of
category, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and specification is
patentable. In other words, if a discovery otherwise meets the
requirements of patentability, then the discovery will be properly
patentable without need to consider non-statutory subject matter
restrictions such as the bars against mathematical algorithms,
products of nature, or natural phenomena. 177
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Sterne & Bugaisky, supra note 162, at 219.
Bakels, supra note 170, at ¶ 43.
Id.
Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008).
Id. at 591.
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His rule finds its support in the language of the statute 178 and ignores
the inconsistencies of current patentable subject matter jurisprudence,
which, he argues, “if extended to logical conclusions, would bar
patentability of almost any invention or discovery, which certainly would
present a suboptimal outcome.” 179 Implementing a threshold standard for
statutory subject matter, with the only requirement that an invention meet
the boundaries of a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” would
alleviate much of the controversy and inconsistent interpretation of this
gatekeeper section. 180
Risch argues that any question regarding the patentability of new
technologies “should be answered by the general criteria that Congress has
established—criteria that have worked for over 150 years—to determine
whether a particular patent claim should be allowed.” 181 He believes that
such a change would allow the Patent and Trademark Office and the courts
to better focus their energies on “how best to apply rigorous standards of
novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and specification with a scalpel rather than
simply eliminating broad swaths of innovation with a machete.” 182 There is
something to be said for a system that allows a patent to speak for itself on
its own merits—through a meeting of the requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness, written description, and enablement—rather than simply
barring its entrance at the door. 183 The downside of this approach is the
Constitutional implications it may have. The Constitution requires an
invention to secure a patent. 184 Without a standard for determining whether
or not the subject matter itself is patentable, the original and basic
regulations of the U.S. patent system are not met.
Medical diagnostic claims, and biotechnology as a whole, could benefit
from Risch’s broad rule. Creating a low bar to patentable subject matter
allows the decision of whether or not to grant a particular patent to be based
on the merits of the invention rather than its compliance with a rigid test.
The low threshold afforded § 101 does not render the section meaningless,
but instead gives it the breadth envisioned by Congress and places the
burden of patentability on those sections that function to evaluate a patent
for more than its objective subject matter.
One final approach to consider is the implementation of flexible legal
standards, or “policy levers”, proposed by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley. 185
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 594.
Id. at 592.
See id. at 593–94.
Id. at 657.
Risch, supra note 176, at 658.
See Sterne & Bugaisky, supra note 162, at 220.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 149.
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This approach proposes recognition and increased implementation of
flexible legal standards, most of which are already operating in patent law,
to take account of the varied types of innovations present in the different
industries operating under the monolith of U.S. Patent Law. 186 Some “levers
operate at an industry-wide or ‘macro’ level, treating different industries
differently as a whole . . . [while others] work at a case-by-case ‘micro’
level, treating some kinds of inventions differently than others without
explicit regard to industry, but in a way that has disproportionate effects on
certain industries.” 187 The strength of their proposal comes from its inherent
flexible application to a wide variety of industries and technologies. Unlike
the inflexible, bright-line rules favored by the Federal Circuit (of which the
“machine-or-transformation” test is a perfect example), legal standards are,
by their very nature, “case-by-case decisional criteria that can take
situational variance into account.” 188 The indeterminate nature of this
approach is likely to create uncertainty, especially when compared to a
bright-line rule. Although the authors argue that standards provide the court
with the ability to balance the interests of a particular industry with its
effect on the public in a consistent and specific manner, 189 they do not
address the issue of technologies that cross technological boundaries or the
uncertainty in areas where standards have not yet been established. The
effects on the stability of the patent system and its implications on
upcoming technologies are unclear.
Unlike the rigid test in Bilski, however, a move towards the application
of industry specific standards of patentability would prevent the inherent
problems and inconsistencies exemplified by the decisions in Classen and
Prometheus. Such an approach would take the analysis of § 101 back to its
initial broad standard, but would elevate the analysis to encompass and
control the varied technologies it covers. Medical diagnostic claims would
benefit from such a system as it offers the Court and Congress the ability to
tailor standards to address, for example, the diverging public policy
interests of the biotech industry and the public as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
In a single action, the Federal Circuit overturned more than a decade of
relative stability in rejecting the State Street “useful, concrete and tangible
result” standard in favor of a new “machine-or-transformation” test. As
illustrated by the decisions in Classen and Prometheus, the rigid Bilski
standard poses a significant threat of inconsistent application and
uncertainty. Accordingly, the Supreme Court must articulate a new
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 1576–79.
Id. at 1579.
Id. at 1639.
Id.
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standard, or, at the very least, return to the status quo of State Street,
restoring 35 U.S.C. § 101 to a broad utility standard that is consistent with
public policy, precedent, and the statute’s original legislative design.

